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How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt?  
The  Balance-Matching Heuristic†
By John Gathergood, Neale Mahoney, Neil Stewart, and Jörg Weber*
We study how individuals repay their debt using linked data on mul-
tiple credit cards. Repayments are not allocated to the higher interest 
rate card, which would minimize the cost of borrowing. Moreover, 
the degree of misallocation is invariant to the economic stakes, which 
is inconsistent with optimization frictions. Instead, we show that 
repayments are consistent with a  balance-matching heuristic under 
which the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share 
of balances on each card. Balance matching captures more than half 
of the predictable variation in repayments and is highly persistent 
within individuals over time. (JEL D14, D15, D91, G41)
Borrowing decisions underpin a broad set of economic behavior. Individuals bor-
row to smooth their consumption over the  life cycle, invest in human capital, and 
purchase durable goods, among other reasons. Thus, understanding how individuals 
borrow is an important input for many fields of economic research and is directly 
relevant for consumer financial policy.
In this paper, we examine competing models of how individuals make debt pay-
ments, and thus implicitly how to borrow, across their portfolio of credit cards. We 
have a dataset with rich information on credit card contract terms, monthly state-
ments, and repayments for 1.4 million individuals in the United Kingdom over a 
 two-year period. Unlike other leading credit card datasets, our data allow us to link 
together multiple credit card accounts held by the same individual.1 We study how 
1 For instance, neither the OCC’s Consumer Credit Panel nor the CFPB’s Credit Card Database are designed to 
permit linking of accounts held by the same individual. The credit bureau datasets that combine information from 
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individuals choose to allocate repayments across their credit cards, holding the total 
repayment in each month fixed.2
The credit card repayment decision is an ideal laboratory for studying borrow-
ing because behavior that minimizes interest charges, what we refer to as optimal 
behavior, can be clearly defined. Consider individuals with debt on exactly two 
cards: holding the total amount repaid fixed, it is optimal for these individuals to 
make the minimum payment on both cards, repay as much as possible on the high 
interest rate card, and only allocate further payments to the low interest rate card if 
they are able to pay off the high interest rate card in full. What sets the credit card 
repayment decision apart from many other financial decisions is that optimal behav-
ior does not depend on preferences, such as risk preferences or time preferences.3 
This allows us to evaluate models of behavior without having to jointly estimate 
preference parameters.
The first part of the paper documents that individuals do not optimally allocate 
their payments across cards. Our baseline analysis focuses on individuals who hold 
exactly two cards in our dataset. For these individuals, the average difference in 
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) between the high and low interest rate cards is 6.3 
percentage points, approximately  one-third of the average 19.7 percent APR in our 
sample. If these individuals were completely unresponsive to interest rates, it is 
natural to assume that they would allocate 50.0 percent of their payments to each 
card on average. To minimize interest charges, we calculate that individuals should 
allocate 97.1 percent of the payments in excess of the minimum to the high APR 
card.4 We show that individuals allocate only 51.5 percent of their excess payments 
to the high APR card, behavior that is virtually indistinguishable from the com-
pletely  non-responsive baseline. In other words, 85 percent of individuals should 
put 100 percent of their excess payments on the high interest rate card but only 
10 percent do so.5
This finding of  non-optimal repayments closely matches prior research by Ponce, 
Seira, and Zamarripa (2017) on credit card borrowing in Mexico. In particular, the 
most comparable result is that the share of payments in excess of the minimum 
misallocated to the high APR card is 50 percent among Mexican credit card hold-
ers and 46 percent among UK credit card holders. A possible explanation for the 
 non-optimal repayments was that Mexican borrowers may not have had enough 
multiple accounts held by the same individual do not have information on interest rates or repayments. There are a 
number of  opt-in panels such as the Mint.com data and Lightspeed Research’s Ultimate Consumer Panel that have 
information on multiple cards, but only for a  self-selected sample of individuals.
2 This type of allocative decision is common. In the UK market that we study, 46.1 percent of credit card holders 
have 2 or more cards, and this group accounts for 72.2 percent of outstanding balances (Financial Conduct Authority 
2016). In the US market, 71.5 percent of credit card holders have 2 or more cards, and this group accounts for 91.8 
percent of balances (authors’ calculations using a representative sample of 2015 TransUnion credit bureau data).
3 For example, optimal mortgage choices depend on risk preferences (in the decision to use an adjustable or 
fixed rate mortgage) and time preferences over the real option to refinance in the future (see Campbell and Cocco 
2003). There are very few institutional settings in which optimal mortgage choices can be clearly defined, such as 
in the Danish mortgage market (see Andersen et al. 2017). The optimal credit card spending allocation depends on 
rewards programs, such as  cash-back or airline points. Even when the terms of the rewards program are known, the 
optimal spending allocation depends on individuals’ (idiosyncratic) value of features.
4 The number is not exactly 100 percent because sometimes individuals can pay off the full balance by allocating 
a smaller amount, in which case they should allocate the remaining amount to the low interest rate card.
5 In Section II, we show that this result extends to the samples where we observe individuals allocating repay-
ments across three, four, and five cards.
846 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2019
experience with credit cards, or enough financial sophistication, compared to bor-
rowers in  highly-developed countries. The results in our paper show, to the contrary, 
the same degree of  non-optimal repayments even in the United Kingdom, providing 
a striking example of uniformity of a behavioral bias across very different cultures 
and financial settings.6
The second part of the paper examines whether optimization frictions can explain 
the observed repayment behavior. In optimal inattention models, individuals face a 
fixed cost of optimization, such as the time, psychological, or cognitive costs asso-
ciated with determining the optimal repayment allocation (Sims 2003). Because 
of this fixed cost, these models predict that the degree of misallocation should be 
decreasing in the financial stakes of the repayment decision. We show, however, 
that the share of misallocated repayments is invariant to the difference in interest 
rates across cards (which can be as large as 15 percentage points), the size of the 
repayment amount (which can be as high as £800 in a month), as well as a combined 
measure of the “financial stakes” of the repayment decision. We also show that the 
degree of misallocation is invariant to the time since account opening, suggesting 
that a learning model cannot explain observed behavior.7
The third part of the paper considers a number of different heuristics that might 
better explain repayment behavior. We consider a  balance-matching heuristic under 
which the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on 
each card. Balance matching could arise from the salient placement of balances 
on credit card statements and the broad tendency for humans, and other species, to 
engage in “matching behavior” in related choice environments. Balance matching 
could also arise from individuals repaying a constant percentage of the balance on 
each card in a given month, a  rule-of-thumb that would lead to inefficient behavior 
on both the allocative and extensive margins. We also consider five alternative heu-
ristics, including a 1/N heuristic (Benartzi and Thaler 2001), in which payments are 
split evenly across cards, and the “debt snowball method,” in which payments are 
concentrated on the card with the lowest balance, as recommended by some finan-
cial advisors.8
We assess the explanatory power of these different repayment models using 
standard measures of  goodness-of-fit (root mean square error, mean absolute error, 
Pearson’s  ρ ). To provide a lower benchmark, we calculate  goodness-of-fit under 
the assumption that the percentage of repayments on the high APR card is ran-
domly drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0 percent to 100 per-
cent interval. To provide an upper benchmark, we use machine learning techniques 
to find the repayment model that maximizes  out-of-sample fit using a rich set of 
explanatory variables.
6 The United Kingdom has a long history and high rate of credit card use. Credit cards were introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1966, making it the second country after the United States to adopt credit cards. The share of 
adults with a credit card is 60 percent in the United Kingdom (UK Cards Association 2017) relative to 9.5 percent 
in Mexico (BBVA 2015).
7 Misallocation is similarly invariant to the number of days between payment dates, suggesting that frictions in 
coordinating repayments across cards with different due dates cannot explain repayment behavior.
8 For example, see syndicated radio host Dave Ramsey: https://www.daveramsey.com/blog/get-out-of-debt-
with-the-debt-snowball-plan. Also see Amar et al. (2011) and Brown and Lahey (2015) for experimental studies 
that investigate this hypothesis.
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We find that balance matching captures more than half of the “predictable vari-
ation” in repayment behavior. That is, based on the range determined by the lower 
benchmark of random repayments and the upper benchmark of the machine learning 
models, we find that balance matching is closer to the upper benchmark on all of 
our measures. We also show that the optimal repayment rule and the other heuristic 
models do not come close to balance matching in their ability to match the data, 
capturing less than one-quarter of the predictable variation for most measures.9 In 
sensitivity analysis, we show that our results are robust to two potential threats to 
validity. First, we show that our results are not explained by anchoring on minimum 
payments (Stewart 2009,  Navarro-Martinez et al. 2011, Keys and Wang forthcom-
ing). Second, we show that our results are not driven by individuals using automatic 
payments (autopay), which is rarely used in our baseline sample.
We also evaluate each of our models in “horse race” type analysis where we 
determine the best fit model on an individual  × month basis. In binary tests, bal-
ance matching has the best fit for twice as many observations as either the random, 
optimal, or other heuristics models. In specifications where we allow for multiple 
types, balance matching is the best fit model for roughly half of the observations 
in our sample. We also show that balance matching exhibits a high degree of per-
sistence within individuals over time, suggesting that balance matching is more 
than a good statistical model but is actually capturing a stable feature of individual 
 decision-making.
In addition to providing us with an upper benchmark, the machine learning mod-
els allow us to assess the relative importance of interest rates versus balances in 
predicting repayment behavior. Consistent with the poor fit of the optimal repay-
ment rule, we find that interest rates have low variable importance (i.e., proportional 
increase in  R 2 ) in our machine learning models. Consistent with the balance match-
ing results, we find that balances have the highest variable importance, with variable 
importance substantially larger than any of the other explanatory variables. Unlike 
some other machine learning applications (e.g., Mullainathan and  Spiess 2017), 
these results are robust across partitions of the data.
Our findings are related to a number of strands of research. The finding of 
 non-optimal repayments is closely related to the aforementioned Ponce, Seira, 
and Zamarripa (2017) study on credit card borrowing in Mexico, and more broadly 
related to a larger literature on  non-optimal behavior in consumer financial markets 
(e.g., Agarwal, Skiba, and  Tobacman 2009; Keys, Pope, and  Pope 2016; Jørring 
2018).10
Our investigation of optimal inattention models contributes to active literature on 
the explanatory power of these frameworks. For instance, consistent with our find-
ings, Chetty et al. (2014) show that individuals in Denmark are inattentive in their 
pension contributions regardless of the economic stakes, pushing against models of 
optimal inattention. In contrast, in online experiments, Taubinsky and  Rees-Jones 
(2018) find sharp evidence that attention to taxes is increasing in tax rates,  supporting 
9 The one exception is the  1 / N heuristic, which captures some behavior exactly, and has a comparable 
 goodness-of-fit with the root mean square error metric.
10 Our paper is more broadly related to a literature that examines how credit card utilization responds to changes 
in contract terms and shocks to income (e.g., Gross and Souleles 2002, Agarwal et al. 2018, Olafsson and Pagel 
2018).
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these models. While we do not believe there is a single correct model for behavior, 
our results suggest that in the credit card repayment domain, optimal inattention 
models have little explanatory power.
The balance matching result relates to a  well-established literature in psychology 
on matching behavior. In a seminal paper, Herrnstein (1961) showed that pigeons 
peck keys for food in proportion to the time it takes for the keys to rearm rather than 
concentrating their effort on the key that rearms most quickly. This behavior, which 
became known as the “matching law,” has since been documented across a number 
of species. More recently, a large experimental literature has shown evidence of 
“probability matching” in repeated choice experiments. For instance, when faced 
with repeated choices between a gamble with a 70 percent chance of winning and 
one with a 30 percent chance of winning, subjects choose gambles in proportion to 
the chances of winning, even though choosing the gamble with the higher payoff is a 
dominant strategy (see Vulkan 2000 for a review). We discuss this literature, and our 
relation to it, in more depth in Section IV. To the best of our knowledge, our paper 
provides the first evidence of matching in the field.11
The caveats to our analysis largely stem from the fact that we focus on the alloc-
ative decision of how individuals split repayments across their portfolio of credit 
cards. While this decision greatly simplifies the analysis, our estimates of the 
degree of  non-optimal behavior should be interpreted as lower bounds relative to a 
counterfactual in which individuals could additionally reallocate payments across 
 non-credit card loans (such as mortgages or automobile loans) or make adjustments 
on the extensive margin (e.g., by adjusting the trade-off between debt repayment 
and consumption). As we mention above, our focus on the allocative decision also 
naturally leads us to consider “allocative heuristics,” such as balance matching, 
rather than heuristics that determine behavior on the extensive margin (repaying a 
fixed percentage of the balances).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our data and pres-
ents summary statistics for our baseline sample. Section II presents our results on the 
optimality of repayment behavior. Section III tests whether optimal inattention and 
learning can fit the observed behavior. Section IV lays out alternative heuristics for 
debt repayment, including the  balance-matching heuristic. Section V tests between 
these repayment models. Section VI discusses the implications of these results for 
the industrial organization of credit card markets and public policy. Section VII 
concludes.
I. Data
A. Argus Credit Card Data
Our data source is the Argus Information and Advisory Services’ Credit Card 
Payments Study (CCPS). The CCPS has detailed information on contract terms and 
billing records from five major credit card issuers in the United Kingdom. These 
issuers have a combined market share of over 40 percent and represent a broad 
11 See DellaVigna (2009) for a review of the evidence on choice heuristics using field data.
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range of credit card products and market segments. We have obtained monthly data 
covering January 2013 to December 2014 for a 10 percent representative sample 
of individuals in the CCPS who held a credit card with at least 1 of the 5 issuers. 
Unlike other leading credit card datasets, the CCPS provides us with anonymized 
 individual-level identifiers that allow us to link together multiple accounts held by 
the same individual (see footnote 1).12
B. Sample Restrictions
Our interest lies in understanding how individuals make repayment decisions 
across their portfolio of credit cards. Holding multiple cards is not uncommon. 
In the UK market, 46.1 percent of credit card holders have 2 or more cards, and 
individuals with 2 or more cards account for 72.2 percent of outstanding balances 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2016).13
Our unit of analysis is the individual  × month. In the remainder of the paper, we 
refer to individual  × months interchangeably as “observations.” All of the credit 
cards in our data require payments at a monthly frequency. We consider cards to be 
in the same “month” if their billing cycles conclude in the same calendar month. 
Since billing cycles often conclude near the end of the calendar month, payment 
dates are often quite near to each other.14 We construct separate samples based on 
the number of credit cards held by the individual in that month in our dataset (e.g., 
two cards, three cards, and so on). This is a weak lower bound on the number of 
cards held by the individual. In the analysis that follows, we typically start by pre-
senting our methodology and results for the  two-card sample, and then examine how 
our findings extend to individuals with three or more cards.
We implement our sample restrictions at the individual  × month level, excluding 
months that do not satisfy our restrictions, but otherwise keeping these individuals 
in our sample. To focus on repayment decisions, we drop observations where indi-
viduals are delinquent or have defaulted on at least one card in their portfolio, or 
where individuals pay less than the minimum due or more than the full balance on at 
least one card.15 Together, these restrictions drop 2.0 percent of individuals and 4.2 
percent of aggregate revolving debt from the  two-card sample. Second, we focus on 
observations in which individuals hold debt on all of their cards, i.e., they are carry-
ing “revolving” balances. This ensures that allocating repayments toward the high 
12 While we do not have data that would allow us to comprehensively examine the representativeness of the 
CCPS data, the distribution of interest rates in the CCPS is very similar to the aggregate distribution reported in UK 
Cards Association (2013), suggesting that the CCPS is roughly representative of the entire market.
13 These numbers are even higher in the US market. Using a representative sample of 2015 TransUnion data, we 
calculate that 71.5 percent of credit card holders have 2 or more cards, and individuals with 2 or more cards account 
for 91.8 percent of balances and 91.7 percent of revolving balances.
14 In the  two-card sample,  two-thirds of observations have payment dates that are ten days apart or fewer. See 
online Appendix Figure A4 for a histogram of the difference in due dates between cards.
15 Paying less than the minimum or more than full balance sometimes results from “mistakes” that are difficult 
to interpret with an allocative model of behavior. For instance, zero payments sometimes result from “forgetting” 
to put a check in the mail. Similarly, overpayments sometimes result from refunds that are processed after the indi-
vidual decides on their payment, which reduce the balance below the payment amount.
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APR card, in the manner described in Section II, minimizes interest charges.16,17 
These restrictions remove a further 25 percent of individuals from the  two-card sam-
ple. However, since most of these individuals do not have revolving debt (i.e., they 
are “transactors” who repay the balances in full each month), we only drop 12.7 per-
cent of aggregate revolving debt.
Third, we make a number of sample restrictions so that we focus on observations 
where individuals, holding fixed total monthly repayments, have scope to reallocate 
payments across cards and therefore face an economically meaningful allocative 
decision. In particular, we drop a small number of observations where the interest 
rate is identical across cards, since any reallocation of payments has no impact on 
the cost of borrowing. We then drop observations where the individual pays either 
the full balance or the minimum payment on all of their cards, since these individu-
als do not have any payments to reallocate. Taken together, this third set of restric-
tions drops an additional 35.4 percent of individuals and 24.9 percent of aggregate 
revolving debt in the  two-card sample. Online Appendix Table A1 goes through the 
third set of restrictions  one-by-one. Most of the reduction is due to dropping indi-
viduals who pay exactly the minimum on each card.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the baseline  two-card sample. The average 
difference in APR (for purchases) between the high and low interest rate cards is 6.3 
percentage points, or approximately  one-third of the 19.7 percent average purchase 
APR in the sample.18 Yet despite this substantial difference in prices, utilization is 
remarkably similar. Purchases are £128 on the high APR card versus £117 on the 
low APR card; repayments are £260 on the high APR card versus £230 on the low 
APR card; and revolving balances are £2,200 on the high APR card versus £2,054 
on the low APR card. This is particularly striking given that credit limits are almost 
three times larger than revolving balances on average, indicating that the typical 
individual would be able to shift all of their borrowing to the low APR card without 
exceeding their credit limit.
II. Optimal Repayments
In this section, we compare actual and  interest-cost-minimizing allocation of 
repayments across cards. We refer to the  interest-cost-minimizing allocation as the 
“optimal” allocation because it is hard to think of a (reasonable) scenario where 
minimizing interest costs would not be optimal. Holding the total repayment amount 
16 A (complicated) feature of credit cards is that if an individual carries no revolving balance at the beginning 
of the month, and repays the balance in full, they avoid any interest charges that month. If an individual carries a 
revolving balance at the beginning of the month, interest charges are incurred on average daily balance irrespective 
of whether the card is repaid in full. We focus on individuals who begin the month with revolving balances on all 
cards as it is unambiguously  interest-cost-minimizing for these individuals to allocate repayments toward the high 
APR card. In other scenarios, it could be  interest-cost-minimizing to allocate repayments toward the low APR 
(although our  back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest this is unlikely).
17 One consequence of this restriction is that we omit individuals who have two cards but hold revolving bal-
ances on only one card. In doing so, one potential concern is that we drop individuals who have “fully optimized” 
by completely paying off their high interest rate card. If this were the case, then our sample would be selected on 
individuals who failed to optimize, raising issues of external validity. However, among individuals who carry debt 
on only one card, the majority (61.8 percent) carry debt on only the high interest rate card, indicating that our sam-
ple is not selected in this manner.
18 This difference does reflect  short-term 0 percent promotional interest rate offers, which account for less than 
5 percent of account  × month observations in the baseline sample.
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on all cards fixed, it is optimal for individuals to make the minimum required pay-
ment on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with the highest 
interest rate, and only allocate further payments to the lower interest rate cards if 
they are able to pay off the highest interest rate card in full.19
We focus on repayments, rather than other measures of credit card use like spend-
ing or revolving balances, because, for repayments, we can clearly define optimal 
behavior. In contrast, optimal spending may depend upon rewards programs, which 
we do not observe in our data.20 We also do not focus on the optimality of revolving 
balance allocations because revolving balances are a “stock” that cannot typically be 
quickly adjusted.21 Thus, to determine whether revolving balances are “optimal,” we 
would need to take a stand on how individuals could reallocate revolving  balances 
19 We explicitly rule out the possibility that choosing not to make the minimum payment on a lower interest rate 
card could be optimal. Failing to repay the minimum repayment would result in a penalty fee and a marker on the 
individual’s credit file.
20 While issuers typically incur only a small cost for the rewards they provide (approximately 1 percent: see 
Agarwal et al. 2015), individuals might value rewards (such as airline points) at a high enough value to affect opti-
mal spending decisions.
21 In particular, with the exception of balance transfer products in the prime credit card market, individu-
als can only reallocate their stock of revolving balances by adjusting the flow of spending and repayments on a 
 month-by-month basis.
Table 1—Summary Statistics
High APR card Low APR card Difference
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3)
Card characteristics
APR: Purchases (percent) 22.87 4.80 16.56 6.40 6.30 5.85
APR: Cash advances (percent) 26.08 4.12 23.72 5.28 2.36 6.31
Monthly credit limit (£) 6,388.77 4,443.05 6,013.20 4,092.41 375.57 4,856.48
Spending (£)
Purchases 128.09 432.43 116.53 397.63 11.56 570.04
Purchases if > £0 380.17 672.79 360.06 629.70 −2.80 798.02
Cash advances 6.47 73.29 5.81 73.74 0.66 97.25
Cash advances if > £0 216.98 366.68 215.01 395.20 −5.42 352.15
Payments (£)
Repayments 259.76 733.92 229.69 657.60 30.07 913.65
Interest paid (£)
Purchases 38.48 59.49 28.97 48.32 9.51 61.64
Cash advances 1.49 10.73 0.91 7.13 0.58 11.88
Card cycle (£)
Closing balance 3,020.54 3,115.48 3,032.15 2,967.13 −11.61 3,478.14
Revolving balance 2,200.01 2,890.49 2,053.68 2,796.17 146.33 3,082.07
Minimum amount due 63.24 68.84 56.80 58.32 6.43 71.55
Card status
Predicted charge-off rate (percent) 1.80 3.03 1.65 2.56 0.13 3.11
Tenure (months since account opened) 104.82 78.13 78.53 70.10 26.30 84.55
Number of account-months 394,111 394,111 394,111
Notes: Summary statistics for the two-card sample restricted to individual  × months in which individuals face an 
economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section IB for more details on the sample construction. APR 
stands for annual percentage rate. Predicted charge-off rate is the predicted probability that the credit card is charged 
off within the next six months. The exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the midpoint of our sample period.
852 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2019
through counterfactual spending and repayment decisions over time, which would 
require us to know the individuals’ time preference and their expectations over 
future spending and repayment decisions.
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the distribution of actual and optimal payments in the 
baseline  two-card sample. The distribution of actual repayments appears close to 
symmetric, with a mass point at 50 percent, and smaller mass points at 33 per-
cent and 67 percent. In contrast, the distribution of optimal repayments is heav-
ily weighted toward the high APR card. It is not optimal for individuals to place 
100 percent of their payments on the high interest rate card because (i) they need to 
pay the minimum on the low interest rate card and (ii) they are sometimes able to 
pay off more than the full balance on the high interest rate card.
Summary data for actual and optimal repayments for the  two-card sample are 
shown in Table 2. On average, individuals should allocate 70.7 percent of  repayments 
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Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of actual and optimal payments on the high interest rate card in the  two-card 
sample. Panels B to D show radar plots of mean actual and optimal payments in the samples with three to five 
cards. In the radar plots, cards are ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest APR (starting at the first node 
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D: 19,120. See Section IB for details on the sample construction.
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to the high APR card. If individuals were completely unresponsive to interest rates, 
we might expect them to place 50 percent of payments on the high interest rate card. 
On average, individuals allocate 51.2 percent to the high interest rate card, which is 
very close to the completely  non-responsive baseline. Individuals, thus, misallocate 
19.5 percent of their total monthly payment on average.
In online Appendix Figure A1, we plot misallocated repayments in excess of the 
minimum payment. That is, we subtract out the amount required to make the min-
imum payment on each card and then calculate the share of the remaining amount 
that is allocated across cards. On average, individuals should allocate 97.1 percent 
of payments in excess of the minimum to the high APR card, whereas in practice 
they actually allocate 51.5 percent to that card.22 Alternatively put, over 90 percent 
of individuals should put 100 percent of their excess payments on the high interest 
rate card but fewer than 10 percent do so. Summary data for payments in excess of 
minimum are shown in online Appendix Table A2.
Panels B to D of Figure 1 show radar plots of the average percentage of actual 
and optimal payments on each card for the samples with 3, 4, and 5 cards. In each 
of the plots, the cards are ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest APR 
(starting at the first node clockwise from noon). The polygons for actual payments 
22 The number is not exactly 100 percent because sometimes individuals can pay off the full balance by allocat-
ing a smaller amount, in which case they should allocate the remaining amount to the low interest rate card.
Table 2—Actual and Optimal Payments, Interest Savings from Optimizing
Percentiles
Mean SD 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Panel A. Actual and optimal payments on the high APR card
1. As percent total monthly payment
 Actual payment 51.22 24.21 16.86 33.33 50.00 67.99 84.78
 Optimal payment 70.74 22.17 38.10 55.92 75.23 89.48 95.83
 Difference 19.52 23.75 0.00 0.72 9.91 32.40 54.55
2. Payment in £
 Actual payment 259.76 733.92 25.00 45.49 100.00 200.00 450.00
 Optimal payment 377.30 849.70 32.62 65.00 138.51 307.09 807.21
 Difference 117.54 422.14 0.00 1.00 17.80 75.00 237.47
Panel B. Annualized interest savings from optimizing credit card repayments
Percentiles
Mean SD 75th 90th
Two cards 64.82 115.33 70.39 167.41
Three cards 121.26 463.63 133.44 414.36
Four cards 198.40 665.57 262.80 703.68
Five cards 247.65 851.83 366.96 926.88
Notes: Panel A shows summary statistics for actual and optimal payments on the high APR card. The top panel 
shows values as a percentage of total payments on both cards in that month. The bottom panel shows values in £. 
N = 394,111. Percentiles and other summary statistics are taken with respect to individual  × month observations. 
Panel B shows summary statistics for annualized interest savings from a counterfactual “steady state” where indi-
viduals optimize balances across the credit cards we observe in our data, subject to the constraint of not exceed-
ing their credit limits. The two-card sample has  N = 394,111, the three-card sample has  N = 264,420, the four 
card sample has  N = 83,880, and the five-card sample has  N = 19,120. In both panels, the sample is restricted to 
 individual  × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section IB for 
more details on the sample construction. The exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the midpoint of our sample period.
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are symmetric, indicating that the actual percentage of payments is very similar 
across cards. The polygons for optimal payments show that it would be optimal to 
allocate a substantially higher percentage of payments to the highest APR card and 
a substantially lower percentage to the card with the lowest APR.
As we mention in the introduction, these findings on misallocation are strikingly 
similar to those documented by Ponce, Seira, and Zamarripa (2017) using a sample 
of Mexican credit card holders. In particular, the most comparable result is that the 
share of payments in excess of the minimum misallocated to the high APR card is 
50 percent among Mexican credit card holders and 46 percent among UK credit card 
holders. This remarkable similarity shows that misallocation among Mexican credit 
card holders is not due to their relatively limited experience with credit cards; in 
the UK, market penetration is 66 percent and cards have been available since 1966.
A. Costs of Misallocation
What are the costs of the failure to optimize? Our baseline approach is to consider 
the annualized interest savings from a counterfactual “steady state” where individ-
uals optimize balances across the credit cards we observe in our data, subject to the 
constraint of not exceeding their credit limits. For the two-card sample, we construct 
the optimal allocation by transferring balances from the high to the low interest rate 
card up to the point where the individual “maxes out” their low interest rate card. 
With multiple cards, we construct the optimal allocation by allocating as much of 
the aggregate balance as possible to the credit card with the lowest interest rate, then 
allocating any remaining balance to the card with the next lowest rate, and so on. 
The interest savings from this exercise can be thought of as the interest savings that 
could be achieved if the individual was immediately and costlessly able to conduct 
the optimal “balance transfer” of balances across cards.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the annualized interest savings from this exercise. 
Average interest savings are increasing across the number of cards, rising from £65 
in the  two-card sample to £248 in the  five-card sample. Because the degree of mis-
allocation is not declining in the economic stakes of the decision, individuals with 
larger balances and larger differences in interest rates have a substantial cost of 
misallocation, with the ninetieth percentile rising from £167 in the  two-card sample 
to £927 in the  five-card sample.
In online Appendix B, we present two additional sets of results on the cost of 
misallocation, focusing on the two-card sample to keep the analysis trackable. First, 
we repeat the interest savings calculations above for cards that were excluded by our 
sample restrictions. For some excluded observations, such as those with no revolv-
ing balances, the interest savings are zero. For others, such as observations where 
individuals pay the minimum on both cards, the counterfactual steady state yields 
interest savings. Total savings, which combine positive savings for borrowers and 
zero savings for  non-borrowers, are roughly  one-third those in the baseline sample.
Second, we consider an alternative approach to calculating the cost of misal-
location where counterfactual interest costs are determined by simulating forward 
outcomes when individuals optimally repay their credit cards over time. This simu-
lation is supposed to measure the gains from “learning” the optimal repayment rule, 
which the individual can then implement over time and incrementally shift their 
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balances across cards. While interest savings are small at first, we show that over a 
12-month time horizon, the interest savings from this incremental approach is quite 
similar to the interest savings from our baseline steady-state counterfactual.
There are a number of caveats to these calculations. Since our sample covers 
approximately 40 percent of the market, we likely only observe a subset of an indi-
viduals’ credit card portfolio. Allowing individuals to optimize over more cards 
would necessarily lead to a larger cost of misallocation. And of course, allowing 
individuals to optimize across different types of debt or across savings and borrow-
ing products would lead to even larger values.
III. Optimization Frictions
In this section, we examine whether optimization frictions can explain repayment 
behavior. We start by examining the evidence for optimal inattention models and 
then turn to the evidence for models of learning.
A. Optimal Inattention
In optimal inattention models, individuals face a fixed cost of optimization and 
only “optimize” if the benefits from doing so are greater than this fixed cost (Sims 
2003). Specifically, in our context, individuals are already making positive credit 
card repayments on all of their cards and therefore already paying the fixed cost of 
logging into their bank’s website or sending a check. So by a fixed cost of optimi-
zation, we have in mind the time, psychological, or cognitive costs associated with 
making the optimal repayment relative to making a  non-optimal payment amount.23 
For some individuals, the reduction in interest payments from  cost-minimizing may 
be too low to rationalize incurring this fixed cost.
To investigate this potential explanation, we examine the correlation between the 
percentage of misallocated repayments and the economic stakes of the repayment 
decision in the  two-card sample. We define misallocated payments as the difference 
between optimal and actual payments on the high APR card. We examine three 
measures of the economic stakes: (i) the difference in APR across cards, (ii) the 
total repayment made that month, and (iii) the “financial stakes” of the repayment 
decision, which is defined as the product of the difference in APR across cards and 
the total repayment made that month, and thereby captures the annualized financial 
stakes from the repayment decision. Since the gains from optimizing are increas-
ing in each of these measures, under the fixed cost explanation, the percentage of 
 misallocated repayments should be declining in these three measures. Moreover, for 
individuals with large economics stakes, we would expect the degree of misalloca-
tion to be close to zero.24
23 This contrasts with optimal mortgage refinancing (e.g., Keys, Pope, and Pope 2016), a setting where optimi-
zation would require actively soliciting a new mortgage offer.
24 These measures of economics stakes are not randomly assigned. However, it is important to note that the 
lack of random assignment is only a threat to “external validity” and not to “identification.” Specifically, the fact 
that there are some individuals who do not optimize despite large incentives to do so implies that there are some 
individuals whose behavior cannot be rationalized by an inattention model. What requires a stronger assumption is 
to infer from this pattern that even individuals with small gains from optimization would still not optimize if they 
faced large incentives to do so.
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Panel A of Figure 2 shows a  binned scatter plot of the percentage of misallo-
cated payments against the difference in APR between the high and low interest 
rate cards.25 The flat relationship indicates that individuals are not less likely to 
misallocate repayments even when there is a large APR difference (more than 15 
percentage points). Panel B of Figure 2 shows a  binned scatter plot of the percentage 
of misallocated payments against total repayments on both cards. Again, there is no 
evidence of a decreasing relationship. Indeed, the relationship is increasing because 
individuals who make the largest payments can cover the minimum on the low APR 
card with a smaller percentage of their overall allocation and thus should allocate 
an even larger fraction of payments to the high APR card. Panel C shows there is no 
evidence of a decreasing relationship between the percentage of misallocated pay-
ments and the financial stakes. The relationship is slightly increasing for the same 
reason as the relationship with total payments. Table 3 presents summary statistics 
25 The  binned scatter plot is constructed by partitioning the  x-axis variable into 20  equal-sized groups and plot-
ting the mean of the  y-axis and  x-axis variables for each group. See Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) for more 
details on the  binned scatter plot methodology.
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Figure 2. Misallocated Payments by Economic Stakes
Notes: Figure shows  binned scatter plots (with 20 equally sized bins) of misallocated payments against the differ-
ence in APR across cards (panel A), the total value of payments within the month in pounds (panel B), and the dif-
ference in APR multiplied by the total value of payments within the month (panel C). Local polynomial lines of 
best fit, based on the  non-binned data, are also shown. The  two-card sample is restricted to individual  × months in 
which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section IB for details on the sample 
construction.
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on actual, optimal, and misallocated payments by quintiles of these measures of 
economics stakes.26
B. Learning
An alternative explanation for the observed  non-optimal behavior is that indi-
viduals learn over time (e.g., since opening a card) and that our analysis of the 
 cross-sectional distribution of repayments masks this learning behavior. A model 
with  time-varying adjustment costs (in the spirit of Calvo 1983) would also generate 
a gradual reduction in the degree of misallocation over time.
Panel A of Figure 3 examines this explanation by showing a  binned scatter plot 
of the percentage of misallocated payments against the age (in months) of the high 
APR card. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to individuals who open a high 
26 Online Appendix Figure A2 and Table A4 present the analogous results for misallocated payments in excess 
of the minimum payment.
Table 3—Actual and Optimal Payments on High APR Card by Quintiles of 
Economic Stakes and Card Age
Quintiles of panels A–E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Difference in APR
Difference in APR (percent) 0.81 2.03 3.78 6.44 14.98
Actual payment (percent) 49.79 50.27 50.98 51.86 53.19
Optimal payment (percent) 71.12 70.78 70.34 70.17 71.26
Difference (percent) 21.33 20.51 19.36 18.32 18.07
Panel B. Total payment
Total payment (£) 63.82 125.98 204.23 350.22 1,658.91
Actual payment (percent) 49.70 50.09 51.04 52.62 52.64
Optimal payment (percent) 60.47 66.89 70.04 74.19 81.80
Difference (percent) 10.78 16.80 19.00 21.56 29.16
Panel C. Financial stakes
Financial stakes (£) 1.20 3.70 8.08 17.50 101.91
Actual payment (percent) 49.79 50.19 50.20 51.49 54.42
Optimal payment (percent) 64.67 68.13 68.92 72.20 79.75
Difference (percent) 14.88 17.94 18.71 20.72 25.33
Panel D. Difference in due dates
Difference in due dates (days) 1.03 3.48 6.48 10.83 17.93
Actual payment (percent) 50.83 51.38 51.39 51.30 51.21
Optimal payment (percent) 70.07 70.71 70.65 70.99 71.20
Difference (percent) 19.25 19.33 19.27 19.69 20.00
Panel E. Age of high APR card
Age of high APR card (months) 3.82 5.57 7.50 9.50 11.48
Actual payment (percent) 43.58 43.54 43.65 43.31 43.96
Optimal payment (percent) 72.94 72.83 72.49 71.62 71.44
Difference (percent) 29.36 29.29 28.84 28.31 27.48
Notes: Summary statistics for actual and optimal payments on the high APR card by quintiles 
of economic stakes and card age. Cells report mean values within the quintile. The sample is 
restricted to individual  × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful alloc-
ative decision.  N = 394,111. See Section IB for more details on the sample construction. The 
exchange rate was £1 = $1.32 at the midpoint of our sample period.
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APR during our sample period and for whom we can observe economically mean-
ingful allocation decisions for ten consecutive months. In the plot, the horizontal 
axis starts in the second month after opening, since this is the first month in which 
individuals could have a balance on the high APR card to repay. The plot shows no 
evidence of a reduction in the percentage of misallocated repayments over time.27 
This finding suggests that neither learning nor  time-varying adjustment costs can 
explain the observed  non-optimizing behavior.
A related explanation is that individuals have difficulty optimizing repayments 
across cards when the due dates are far apart in time. From a cognitive perspective, 
individuals may be less likely to process credit card repayments as a joint decision 
when the due dates are far apart. From a budgetary perspective, individuals may face 
 within-month liquidity constraints that prevent them from optimally reallocating 
payments. For example, individuals might receive their paycheck between credit 
card due dates, and therefore have different amounts of  cash-on-hand when making 
their payments. Panel B of Figure 3 examines this explanation by showing a  binned 
scatter plot of the percentage of misallocated payments against the difference in 
payment due dates.28 The flat relationship indicates that these type of  within-month 
allocation frictions cannot explain our result.
While it would be tempting to go beyond this simple analysis and try to quan-
tify the fixed costs required to rationalize observed repayment behavior, doing so 
would require making strong, untestable assumptions. In particular, a key decision 
is whether to model optimization frictions as a fixed cost that needs to be paid every 
27 Table 3 shows the summary statistics that correspond to this figure. Online Appendix Figures A3 and A4 
present the analogous results for misallocated payments in excess of the minimum payment.
28 Table 3 shows the summary statistics that correspond to this figure. Online Appendix Figures A3 and A4 
present the analogous results for misallocated payments in excess of the minimum payment.
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Figure 3. Misallocated Payments by Card Age and Difference in Due Dates
Notes: Figure shows  binned scatter plots (with 20 equally sized bins) of misallocated payments against the dif-
ference in payment due dates (panel A) and age of the high APR card (panel B). Local polynomial lines of best 
fit, based on the  non-binned data, are also shown. The  two-card sample is restricted to individual  × months in 
which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section IB for details on the sample 
construction.
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period (e.g., a transaction cost of adjusting repayments) or as a fixed cost that only 
needs to be paid once (e.g., a  one-time cognitive cost of learning the optimal repay-
ment rule). The estimated fixed costs would largely be determined by this modeling 
decision. If we assumed there was a  period-by-period fixed cost, repayment behav-
ior could be rationalized by modest optimization frictions. If, instead, we assumed 
there was a  one-time fixed cost, the benefits of learning the optimal rule could be as 
large as the discounted sum of interest savings from optimal credit card payments 
over the life cycle, which would imply a very large fixed cost of adjustment. Since 
that data do not provide us with guidance on the appropriate modeling assumption, 
we are hesitant to undertake this exercise.
IV. Heuristics
If individuals do not allocate their payments in an optimal, or constrained  optimal, 
manner, what explains credit card repayments? In the remainder of this paper, we 
evaluate heuristics that might better explain the allocation of repayments. In this 
section, we introduce the set of heuristics that we consider. In Section V, we evaluate 
the explanatory power of these heuristics.
A. Balance Matching
We first consider a  balance-matching heuristic under which individuals match 
the share of repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Let 
 k = 1, …, K index cards,  p k indicate payments, and  q k indicate balances. 
 Balance-matching payments are given by
(1)   p k  _  ∑ κ=1 K  p κ =  
 q k  _  ∑ κ=1 K  q κ for k = 1, …, K ,
subject to the constraint that the individual pays at least the minimum and no more 
than the full balance on any of their cards.29
Repayments consistent with balance matching could arise from the salient place-
ment of balances on credit card statements and the broad tendency for human (and 
other species) to engage in “matching behavior” in related choice environments. As 
shown in online Appendix Figure A5, balances are perhaps the most prominently 
displayed element on credit card statements. The psychological theory of anchoring 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) suggests that individuals might make payments in 
relation to saliently displayed balances (instead of less saliently displayed interest 
rates).30 , 31
29 In the  two-card sample, only 13.0 percent of observations are affected by these constraints. In nearly all of 
these cases, the  balance-matching payment is less than 2 percentage points below the minimum payment amount. 
Treating these observations in other ways (e.g., dropping these observations) does not have a material impact on 
the results.
30 A second reason why balances may be more salient is that balances are denoted in the same units as repay-
ments (£), whereas APR take on different units (percent).
31 Balances also enter the minimum payment formula. Therefore, at least in principle, repayments might depend 
on balances indirectly through the minimum payment amount. We discuss this issue in online Appendix C and show 
that this channel does not explain our results.
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The literature on matching behavior traces back to Herrnstein (1961), who 
showed that pigeons peck keys for food in proportion to the time it takes the keys 
to rearm rather than concentrating their effort on the key that rearms most quickly. 
 Follow-up studies replicated Herrnstein’s “matching law” among pigeons (Baum 
1974, Miller 1976) and documented similar behavior among rats (Jacquet 1972), 
fish (Behrend and Bitterman 1961), and humans when undertaking more complex 
tasks (e.g., Skinner et al. 1996). Writing at the time, Arrow (1958) noted that these 
results challenged conventional economic models of behavior.32
Matching behavior has perhaps been most widely documented among humans in 
repeated lottery choice experiments. In a typical study, subjects are asked to make 
repeated choices between, say, a gamble with a 70 percent probability of winning 
and one with a 30 percent probability of winning. In behavior known as “probabil-
ity matching,” subjects consistently place bets in proportion to the probabilities of 
winning, even though betting on the option with the highest probability  first-order 
stochastically dominants any other decision. The most  well-known papers in the lit-
erature are Rubinstein (2002), Gal (1996), and Loomes (1998). See Vulkan (2000) 
for a review paper that documents probability matching, and its limitations, across 
22 repeated lottery experiments.
Of course, we do not propose balance matching as a precise description of individ-
ual repayment behavior. Pigeons do not measure the time it takes the keys to rearm 
with a stopwatch and we do not mean to suggest that individuals use long division 
to calculate the share of repayments that should be allocated to each card. Instead, 
we propose that individuals use balance matching as an “anchor” for their repay-
ment behavior (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Indeed, since credit card balances 
are fairly stable over time, an individual could approximate a  balance-matching rule 
without knowing the exact balance on each card that month.33
Finally, as we mention in the introduction, repayments consistent with balance 
matching could arise from individuals repaying a constant percentage of the balance 
on each card in a given month. If this percentage changes within individuals over 
time (e.g., 10 percent in January, 15 percent in February, etc.), it would be difficult 
to distinguish a constant percentage model from a balance matching model. If this 
percentage is fixed within individuals over time, we could distinguish between these 
models using random  time-series variation in balances. Unfortunately, we do not 
have random  time-series variation in balances, and the observed variation is likely 
to be driven by factors that also affect repayment decisions.
B. 1/N Rule
The spike in repayments at 50 percent (see panel A of Figure 1) suggests that some 
individuals use a simple  1/N heuristic by which they make  equal-sized repayments 
32 “We have here an experimental situation which is essentially of an economic nature in the sense of seeking to 
achieve a maximum of expected reward, and yet the individual does not in fact, at any point, even in a limit, reach 
the optimal behavior. I suggest that this result points out strongly the importance of learning theory, not only in 
the greater understanding of the dynamics of economic behavior, but even in suggesting that equilibria maybe be 
different from those that we have predicted in our usual theory.” Arrow (1958, p. 14).
33 Ponce, Seira, and Zamarripa (2017) show that there is a positive correlation between the share of payments 
allocated toward cards and the share of debt held on cards, suggesting an approximate  balance-matching rule may 
be at work among their sample of Mexican cardholders.
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across cards, analogous to the  1/N heuristic documented in  defined-contribution 
savings decisions (Benartzi and Thaler 2001). In particular, the excess mass of indi-
viduals who make payments at a  one-to-one ratio is approximately 8.2 percent. If 
we add in the excess mass at  one-to-two and  two-to-one ratios, we can explain 
11.7 percent of repayments.34
While it might be nice to conclude that 11.7 percent of individuals repay accord-
ing to a  1/N rule, there are a number of factors which suggest a more nuanced 
interpretation of the data. First, the  1/N rule could be interpreted as an anchor that 
individuals do not implement exactly. For example, an individual who pays £250 on 
card A and £225 on card B might be intending to split repayments. To account for 
this possibility, we will measure the performance of the  1/N heuristic in our good-
ness-of-fit analysis below. This analysis will gauge how well the  1/N heuristic fits 
the data, even when it does not fit behavior exactly.
A second nuance arises from the fact that  1/N behavior is disproportionally con-
centrated amount individuals who “round” their payments to £50, £100, £200, and 
so on. If an individual rounds up a payment on card A from £80 to £100 and rounds 
down a payment on card B from £120 to £100, then the individual would appear as 
if they intended to make  equal-sized payments, even though, absent rounding, the 
share of payments on each card would be substantially different from 50 percent.
Figure 4 investigates this competing explanation for the spike at 50 percent. 
Panel A plots the distribution of payments on the high APR card in pounds, and 
shows substantial evidence of rounding. We calculate that 19.2 percent of payments 
take on values that are multiples of £100, and 33 percent of payments take on values 
that are multiples of £50 (which obviously includes payments that are multiples of 
£100). Panels B and C show the percentage of payments on the high APR card, split-
ting the sample by whether the individual makes round number payments (defined 
as multiples of £50) or “ non-round” number payments on the high APR card.35
The plots show that the peaks at 50 percent (as well as 33 percent and 66 percent) 
are heavily concentrated among individuals who make round number repayments. 
In the  non-round sample, there is only a small spike at 50 percent, and no discernible 
spike at 33 percent or 66 percent. Thus, at the extreme, we cannot reject the view 
that nearly all of the spike at 50 percent is due to rounding. However, since we do 
not have random variation in whether individuals round, we cannot rule out the other 
extreme that all of these individuals would have allocated 50 percent on the high 
APR card if they had counterfactually not rounded their payments.
Thus, the quantitative importance of  1/N depends upon what assumptions we are 
willing to make. If we think  1/N is something that individuals implement exactly, 
then the  1/N rule captures at most 11.7 percent of repayments, and possibly a lower 
percentage if we believe that some of this is due to rounding. If we view  1/N as an 
34 By excess mass, we are using the terminology that Saez (2010) and Chetty et  al. (2011) use to describe 
bunching in response to kinked tax schedules. In our context, the excess mass is the area in excess of what is 
predicted by a linear extrapolation between points on the histogram just to the left and the right of the  1 / N values.
35 The propensity to make round number payments is highly correlated across cards within an individual  × 
month. We calculate that 73 percent of individuals who make a round number payment on the high APR card also 
make a round number payment on the low APR card, and 78 percent of individuals who make a  non-round number 
payment on the high APR card also make a  non-round number payment on the low APR card. Dividing the sample 
into individuals who make round number repayments on both cards,  non-round number repayments on both cards, 
and a mix of round and  non-round repayments complicates the exposition without changing the results.
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anchor that individuals approximate, then it is best to judge the empirical relevance 
of this measure in the goodness-of-fit analysis that follows.36
C. Other Heuristic Models of Repayment
We also consider four alternative heuristics that capture intuitive economic and 
 non-economic approaches to the allocation of payments. Some of these heuristics 
are based on the capacity of a credit card, which we define as the difference between 
the credit limit and current balance in pounds. We describe these heuristics for the 
 two-card sample, but they could be naturally extended to settings with three or more 
cards.
36 In the goodness-of-fit analysis of the  1 / N heuristic, we drop observations where predicted values are less than 
the minimum payment or more than the full payment on at least one card. 
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Figure 4. Rounding and the  1 / N Rule
Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of payments on the high APR card in £s (excluding the top decile of pay-
ments). Panel B plots the distribution of payments on the high APR card in percent, among individuals who make 
round number payments (exact multiples of £50). Panel C plots the distribution of payments on the high APR 
card in percent, among individuals who make  non-round number payments (not multiples of £50). The round and 
 non-round samples are defined by repayments on the high APR card. See footnote 35 for details. The  two-card sam-
ple is restricted to individual  × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. 
See Section IB for details on the sample construction.
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•  Heuristic 1: Repay the card with the lowest capacity.—Allocate payments to 
the lowest capacity card, subject to paying the minimum on both cards. Once 
capacity is equalized across cards, allocate additional payments to both cards 
equally. Intuitively, by focusing payments on the card with the lowest capacity, 
this heuristic reduces the risk that an accidental purchase will put an individual 
over their credit limit, which would incur an  over-limit fee and marker on the 
individual’s credit file.
•  Heuristic 2: Repay the card with the highest capacity.—Allocate payments 
to the highest capacity card, subject to paying the minimum on both cards. 
Once the highest capacity card is fully repaid, allocate remaining payments to 
the other card. Intuitively, by allocating payments to the card with the highest 
capacity, this heuristic creates maximum “space” for making a large purchase 
on a single card (e.g., buying a television).
•  Heuristic 3: Repay the card with the highest balance.—Allocate payments 
to the highest balance card, subject to paying the minimum on the other card. 
Once balances are equalized across cards, allocate additional payments to both 
cards equally. If individuals dislike having a credit card with a large balance, 
this heuristic reduces the maximum balance they are carrying, and thus might 
explain repayment behavior.
•  Heuristic 4: Repay the card with the lowest balance (debt snowball method).— 
Allocate payments to the lowest balance card, subject to paying the minimum 
on the other card. Once the balance on the lowest balance card is paid down to 
zero, allocate any additional payments to the other card. This heuristic is some-
times referred to as the debt snowball method by financial advisors. Proponents 
argue that paying off a card with a low balance generates a “win” that motivates 
further repayment behavior.37 If an individual fully pays off a card, this heu-
ristic has the additional benefit of “simplifying” the individual’s debt portfolio. 
See Amar et al. (2011) and Brown and Lahey (2015) for laboratory evidence 
on this approach to debt repayment.
D. Interest Payments under Different Heuristics
How costly would it be for consumers to follow these heuristics? We calculate 
annualized interest savings for the steady-state balances that would arise from each 
of the different heuristic models. For example, if consumers follow a balance match-
ing heuristic, then the process of making larger payments on the card with the larger 
balance would cause balances to asymptote to a steady state with equal balances on 
each card.38
37 For example, syndicated radio host Dave Ramsey argues: “But when you ditch the small debt first, you see 
progress. That one debt is out of your life forever. Soon the second debt will follow, and then the next. These little 
wins will give you a confidence boost, you’ll see that the plan is working, and you’ll stick to it” (see https://www.
daveramsey.com/blog/top-5-debt-snowball-questions-answered).
38 The steady-state outcomes of the other heuristics are as follows. Under the  1 / N heuristic, payments are equal 
across cards, and the steady-state balances are unchanged relative to the status quo. Under Heuristic 1 (repay the 
card with the lowest capacity), payments are prioritized to the card with the lowest capacity, and in steady-state 
capacities on the 2 cards are equalized, subject to credit limits. Under Heuristic 2 (repay the card with the highest 
capacity), payments are prioritized to the card with the highest capacity, and in steady-state balances are reduced as 
much as possible on that card, subject to credit limits. Under Heuristic 3 (repay the card with the highest  balance), 
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Online Appendix Table A5 shows the distribution of annualized interest savings 
(compared to actual interest payments) under each heuristic for the  two-card sample. 
We show the interest savings from optimal payments on the first row as a benchmark 
and omit the  1/ N heuristic because steady-state balances are unchanged and interest 
savings are therefore zero. All the heuristics have median savings close to zero, but 
have wide dispersion in savings or losses across observations. This wide dispersion 
occurs because the heuristics prioritize payments to cards based on balances (and 
credit limits), which are not systematically correlated with the optimal behavior of 
prioritizing payments toward the high APR card.
V. Testing Repayment Models
We evaluate balance matching and the other heuristics using two statistical 
approaches. First, we measure the distance between observed and predicted behavior 
using standard measures of  goodness-of-fit (root mean square error, mean absolute 
error, Pearson’s  ρ ). The goal of this analysis is to find the single model that best fits 
the data. Second, we evaluate the performance of our models in “horse race” type 
analysis where we determine the best fit model on an  observation-by-observation 
basis. We conduct binary comparisons where we compare each model to a single 
alternative, and horse races with three or more models, which allows us to classify 
observations into heterogeneous types. We also examine the persistence of the best 
fit model within individuals over time.
A.  Goodness-of-Fit
We start by presenting visual evidence on the  goodness-of-fit of the  balance-matching 
heuristic. Figure 5 examines the fit in the  two-card sample. The left column shows 
the marginal distributions of actual and  balance-matching payments on the high APR 
card. The right column displays the joint distribution using a contour plot. The top 
row shows these relationships for the baseline sample and the bottom row focuses on 
the sample with  non-round number payment amounts. The sample with round num-
ber payment amounts is shown in online Appendix Figure A6.
The histograms (left column) show that the marginal distributions of actual and 
 balance-matching payments are quite similar, except for the spikes at 33 percent, 
50 percent, and 66 percent. The higher mass along the 45-degree line in the joint 
densities (right column) indicates that actual and  balance-matching payments are 
strongly correlated. The correlation is stronger in the  non-round payment sample 
(and weaker in the round number payment sample).39
payments are prioritized to the card with the highest balance, and in steady state the balances on the 2 cards 
are equalized, subject to credit limits. Under Heuristic 4 (repay the card with the lowest balance), payments are 
 prioritized to the card with the lowest balance, and in steady-state balances are minimized on that card, subject to 
credit limits.
39  The weaker correlation in the round payment sample is consistent with a  two-stage model in which individu-
als first decide to make  balance-matching payments and then add noise to the process by rounding their repayment 
amounts. While the heaping in panel A of Figure 4 provides clear evidence of rounding, estimating a  two-stage 
model where individuals round in the second stage is difficult because the second stage rounding function is not 
“invertible.” That is, it is hard to know whether an individual who is paying £100 would have counterfactually paid 
£95 or £105 if they had not rounded their payment.
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Figure 6 examines the fit of the  balance-matching model in the samples with 3, 4, 
and 5 cards. The left column shows marginal distributions of the share of  payments 
on the highest APR card. The right column shows radar plots of the average share 
of actual and  balance-matching payments. In each of the radar plots, the cards are 
ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest balance (starting at the first node 
clockwise from noon). The distribution of payments on the high APR card (left 
column) is similar to predicted payments under balance matching. The radar plots 
(right column) show that the average share of payments is fairly close to those pre-
dicted by balance matching, especially compared to the radar plots that examine 
optimal repayment behavior (Figure 1).
We formally measure the performance of the balance matching and alternative 
models using three standard measures of  goodness-of-fit: the square root of the mean 
square error (RMSE), the mean absolute error (MAE), and the correlation between 
Figure 5. Balance Matching
Notes: Left panels shows the distribution of actual and  balance-matching payments on the high APR card. Right 
panels show the joint density of actual and  balance-matching payments. Panel A shows the baseline sample, panel 
B restricts the sample to  non-round payment amounts (not multiples of £50). Round and  non-round samples are 
defined by repayments on the high APR card. See footnote 35 for details. The  two-card sample is restricted to indi-
vidual  × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful allocative decision. See Section IB for 
details on the sample construction.
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Figure 6. Distribution of Actual and  Balance-Matching Payments on Multiple Cards
Notes: Left column shows the marginal distributions of actual and  balance-matching payments on the high APR 
card. Right column shows radar plots of the mean percentage of actual and  balance-matching payments allocated to 
each card. In the radar plots, cards are ordered clockwise from the highest to the lowest balance (starting at the first 
node clockwise from noon). All samples are restricted to individual  × months in which individuals face an econom-
ically meaningful allocative decision. See Section IB for details on the sample construction.
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actual and predicted payments (Pearson’s  ρ ).40 To help interpret the  goodness-of-fit 
values, we also establish lower and upper benchmarks. For a lower benchmark, we 
calculate  goodness-of-fit under the assumption that the percentage of repayments 
on the high APR card is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support 
on the 0 percent to 100 percent interval. To provide an upper benchmark, we use 
machine learning techniques to construct a set of purely statistical models of repay-
ment behavior. Specifically, we estimate decision tree, random forest, and extreme 
gradient boosting models of the percentage of payments allocated to the high APR 
card. We use the same set of variables which enter into our heuristics (APRs, bal-
ances, spending, and credit limits on both cards) as input variables and “tune” the 
models to maximize  out-of-sample power using standard methods from machine 
learning.41 We use 80 percent of the data sample as the “training” sample and mea-
sure  out-of-sample fit on a 20 percent “ hold-out” sample. For consistency, in the 
analysis that follows, we compare all models using the  hold-out sample. Technical 
details are provided in online Appendix A.
Figure 7 shows these measures of  goodness-of-fit under the different mod-
els. (Online Appendix Table A6 shows the underlying numerical amounts with 
bootstrapped standard errors, constructed by drawing with replacement from the 
 hold-out sample.) The optimal model yields only a very small improvement in the 
RMSE and MAE relative to the lower benchmark. The optimal model does generate 
a meaningful increase in the Pearson correlation, although this is partly because the 
lower benchmark (uniformly distributed random amount) is constructed to have a 
Pearson correlation of zero. The other heuristics perform similarly poorly, with the 
 goodness-of-fit measures generally falling less than one-quarter of the way between 
the lower and upper benchmarks.42
The  goodness-of-fit measures for the  balance-matching model fall slightly more 
than halfway between the lower and upper benchmarks, indicating that balance 
matching captures more than half of the “predictable variation” in repayment behav-
ior. Online Appendix Figure A7 shows  goodness-of-fit separately for the round and 
 non-round samples (defined as multiples of £50). The  balance-matching model cap-
tures a larger fraction of the predictable variation in the  non-round number sample, 
which is consistent with the  two-stage model of payments discussed in footnote 38.
There are two ways to view the performance of the  balance-matching model rel-
ative to the upper benchmark provided by the machine learning models. The glass-
half-full view is that being able to capture more than half of the predictable variation 
in repayment behavior with a simple balance matching model is useful. Balance 
40 Pearson’s  ρ is also the square root of the  R 2 from a univariate regression of actual payments on predicted 
payments.
41 We view these machine learning models as “ prior-free” models of repayment behavior. If we additionally 
include our candidate models (optimal, balance matching, and the other heuristics) as input variables, we obtain 
only small improvements in model fit.
42 Online Appendix Figure A8 shows the marginal distributions of actual and predicted payments under each 
of the alternative heuristics. One common feature of these alternative heuristics is that they predict that individuals 
should often concentrate their excess payments on a single card. For instance, under Heuristic 1 (repay the card 
with the lowest capacity), individuals should fully allocate repayments, in excess of the minimum, to the card with 
the lowest capacity until the point where both cards have equal capacity remaining. Individuals, however, seem to 
avoid “corner solutions” in their repayment behavior. As a result, the alternative heuristics  over-predicted the share 
of individuals who allocate a very small (less 10 percent) or very large (greater than 90 percent) share of payments 
to the high APR card.
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matching is easy to understand, has a psychological underpinning based on existing 
theories of behavior (e.g., probability matching, Herrnstein’s matching law), and 
might provide intuition for individual behavior in  yet-to-be-studied environments. 
The glass-half-empty perspective is that machine learning techniques provide higher 
predictive power. Thus, if the goal is prediction, rather than understanding human 
behavior, machine learning techniques may be preferable.
B. Horse Races between Alternative Models
We next evaluate these models using “horse races” where we determine the best 
fit model on an  observation-by-observation basis. A model that fits a smaller number 
of observations very poorly, but a larger number quite well, might perform poorly 
under the  goodness-of-fit analysis, but would perform well under this approach.
Our ability to identify the  best-fit model on an  observation-by-observation basis 
is due to the unique nature of the credit card repayment decision. As discussed in 
the introduction, what sets credit card repayments apart from many other financial 
decisions is that optimal behavior does not depend on preferences (such as risk pref-
erences or time preferences). If preferences were important for optimal behavior, 
then conducting this type of exercise would require recovering preferences at the 
individual level, which would constitute a significant empirical challenge.
Table 4 shows results of this horse race analysis in the pooled sample of individ-
ual  × months. Panel A compares each of our models  one-by-one against the lower 
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Figure 7.  Goodness-of-Fit for Different Models
Notes:  Goodness-of-fit for different models of the percentage of payments on the high APR card. The left panel 
shows the root mean square error (RMSE), the middle panel shows the mean absolute error (MAE), and the right 
panel shows the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, which can also be interpreted as the square root of the  R 2 . Random 
has repayments on the high APR card randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0 percent 
to 100 percent interval. Optimal is pay minimum required payment on all of their cards, repay as much as possi-
ble on the card with the highest interest rate, and only allocate further payments to the lower interest rate cards if 
they are able to pay off the highest interest rate card in full. Heuristic 1 is repay the card with the lowest capac-
ity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with the highest capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay the card with the highest balance. 
Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest balance (debt snowball method). Balance matching is match the share 
of repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Gradient 
Boost are machine learning models that predict the share of repayments on the high APR card using these methods. 
The  two-card sample is restricted to individual  × months in which individuals face an economically meaningful 
allocative decision. Goodness-of-fit is calculated using the 20 percent  hold-out sample. See Section IB for details 
on the sample construction.
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benchmark where the percentage of repayments on the high APR card is randomly 
drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0 percent to 100   percent 
interval. In a binary comparison, balance matching is the best fit model for 67.1  percent 
of observations, or about twice the percentage of the uniform benchmark. The optimal 
model and the other heuristics are the closest for slightly more than half of the obser-
vations, and therefore perform only slightly better than the uniform benchmark. The 
machine learning models have the best fit for between 69.0 percent and 76.5 percent 
of observations, which is similar to balance matching.43
43 Since the machine learning models were tuned to minimize RMSE, it is natural for these models to perform 
relatively better when evaluated using RMSE (and other distance metrics) than when evaluated using this type of 
horse race analysis.
Table 4—Horse Races between Alternative Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Uniform versus other rules
Win percent
Uniform 32.87 46.66 45.53 50.32 45.44 47.48 47.09 31.01 23.55 27.14
Balance matching 67.13
1/N 53.34
Optimal 54.47
Heuristic 1 49.68
Heuristic 2 54.56
Heuristic 3 52.52
Heuristic 4 52.91
Decision tree 68.99
Random forest 76.45
XGB 72.86
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel B. Balance matching versus other rules
Win percent
Balance matching 60.90 68.97 73.09 67.22 76.65 64.70 50.02 40.87 45.55
1/N 39.10
Optimal 31.03
Heuristic 1 26.91
Heuristic 2 32.78
Heuristic 3 23.35
Heuristic 4 35.30
Decision tree 49.98
Random forest 59.13
XGB 54.45
Notes: Table shows percentage of individual  × month observations that are best fit by different models of repay-
ment behavior. The target variable is the share of repayments on the high APR card. Panel A compares each of our 
models one-by-one against the lower benchmark where the percentage of repayments on the high APR card is ran-
domly drawn from a uniform distribution with support on the 0 percent to 100 percent interval. Panel B compares 
each of the models one-by-one to the balance-matching model. We exclude a comparison of balance matching and 
the uniform model, since it was shown in Panel A. Uniform has repayments on the high APR card randomly drawn 
from a uniform distribution with support on the 0 percent to 100 percent interval. Balance matching is match the 
share of repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Optimal is pay minimum required payment 
on all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with the highest interest rate, and only allocate further 
payments to the lower interest rate cards if they are able to pay off the highest interest rate card in full. Heuristic 1 
is repay the card with the lowest capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with highest capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay 
the card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest balance (debt snowball method). 
Decision Tree, Random Forest, and XGB are machine learning models that predict the share of repayments on the 
high APR card using these methods. Samples are restricted to individual  × months in which individuals face an 
economically meaningful allocative decision. All results shown in the table are based on the 20 percent hold-out 
sample. See Section IB for more details on the sample construction.
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Panel B of Table 4 compares each of the models  one-by-one to the  balance-matching 
model.44 In a horse race with the optimal model, balance matching has the best fit 
for slightly more than  two-thirds of observations. When compared with the other 
heuristic models, balance matching is also the best fit for approximately  two-thirds 
of observations. Balance matching performs comparably to, or only a little worse 
than, the machine learning models, with balance matching exhibiting the best fit for 
40.9 percent to 50.0 percent of observations.45
The binary comparisons are useful for finding the single model that fits the largest 
percentage of observations. A complementary approach is to conduct horse races 
with three or more models, which allows us to classify observations into heteroge-
neous types. One challenge with this exercise is that, simply by chance, virtually any 
model will have the best fit for some observations. To be able to interpret the results 
as reflecting heterogeneity in types, we need to be disciplined in choosing which 
models to include and to also compare the percentage of observations fit by a given 
model to the uniform benchmark.
Online Appendix Table A8 shows the results of this exercise. In column 1, we 
compare the optimal,  1/N , and balance-matching models. These are the models that 
seem plausible based on economic theory (optimal) or evidence ( 1/N and balance 
matching). In column 2, we add the uniform benchmark to the set of models. In both 
specifications, balance matching has the best fit for one-half of the observations. 
Optimal and  1/N capture slightly more than  one-fifth of observations when we do 
not include the uniform benchmark, but perform only marginally better than the 
uniform benchmark when it is included.
To the extent that we think of the competing models as actually representing dif-
ferent models of individual  decision-making, we would naturally expect the  best-fit 
model to be persistent within individuals over time. Table 5 shows the  within-person 
transition matrix for the  best-fit model. The sample is restricted to individual  × 
months where we observe repayment behavior for at least two months in a row. For 
this exercise, we consider all the candidate models, and we fix the uniformly distrib-
uted repayment to be constant within individuals over time.46
The table shows that balance matching exhibits a high degree of persistence, both 
in absolute value and relative to the other models of repayment behavior. Among indi-
viduals whose repayments are best fit by the uniform model in a given month, 23.2 
percent make repayments that are closest to the uniform model in the next month. 
This persistence likely reflects the fact that balances and repayments are sticky over 
time: if the uniform model happens to be accurate in a given month, and balances and 
payments are sticky, then the uniform model, which is fixed to be constant within an 
individual over time, will mechanically be accurate in the next month as well.
The  balance-matching model exhibits  three-fold greater persistence than the uni-
form model. Among individuals whose repayments are closest to balance matching 
44 We exclude a comparison of the  balance-matching and the uniform model, since it was shown in panel A.
45 In unreported analysis, we examined whether there was correlation between the best fit model and postal code 
characteristics (such as postal code income and education). We were unable to detect any economically or statis-
tically significant correlations. However, we caution against drawing too strong conclusions about heterogeneity, 
because we do not know whether postal code characteristics are good proxies for the demographic characteristics 
of our sample of individuals.
46 We drop observations where there is a tie for the best fit heuristic. The number of ties is increasing in the  number 
of models considered. However, the persistence of balance matching is not sensitive to the number of models. 
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in a particular month, 83 percent make payments that are closest to balance match-
ing in the next month. The high degree of persistence suggests that balance match-
ing is more than a good statistical model but is actually capturing a stable feature of 
individual  decision-making. The only other model that exhibits strong persistence 
is the  1 / N rule, which again likely reflects that fact that  1 / N repayments (or the 
tendency to round payments) is a stable feature of individual behavior.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
In online Appendix C, we present two sets of sensitivity analysis. First, for some 
credit cards, minimum payments are set as a proportion of balances. For these cards, 
balance matching behavior could instead arise from individuals making payments 
that are proportional to minimum payments. We rule out this explanation by show-
ing that the balancing matching result holds among cards where minimum payments 
are not proportional to balances. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of our results 
to whether the individual uses automatic payment (autopay). We show that autopay 
is rare in our baseline sample (11 percent). However, when individuals use autopay, 
their propensity to misallocate and to follow a  balance-matching rule is similar to 
that in the  non-autopay sample, suggesting that our results are robust across these 
somewhat different choice environments.
D. Balances and APRs in Machine Learning Models
In addition to providing us with an upper benchmark, the machine learning mod-
els allow us to assess the relative importance of balances and APRs in predicting 
Table 5—Transition Matrix for Best-Fit Model
Current period (%)
Balance
Uniform Matching Optimal H 1 H 2 H 3 H 4 1/N rule
Uniform 23.18 56.71 0.24 1.53 0.35 2.24 0.59 15.18
Balance matching 8.24 83.06 0.13 1.37 1.18 1.07 1.13 3.82
Optimal 9.09 81.82 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Heuristic 1 (pay down lowest capacity) 7.98 49.08 0.00 28.22 0.00 1.84 4.91 7.98
Heuristic 2 (pay down highest capacity) 4.27 66.67 0.00 0.85 24.79 1.71 0.00 1.71
Heuristic 3 (pay down highest balance) 10.28 47.66 0.93 4.67 0.93 17.76 0.00 17.76
Heuristic 4 (pay down lowest balance) 11.59 57.97 0.00 4.35 0.00 1.45 20.29 4.35
1/N rule 18.99 27.89 0.13 2.39 0.40 1.33 0.27 48.61
Notes: Table shows transition matrix for the best-fit payment model. The target variable is the share of repayments 
on the high APR card. In each period, we allow the set J to encompass all of the candidate models, and we fix the 
uniformly distributed repayment to be constant within an individual over time. Balance matching is match the share 
of repayments on each card to the share of balances on each card. Optimal is to pay minimum required payment on 
all of their cards, repay as much as possible on the card with the highest interest rate, and only allocate further pay-
ments to the lower interest rate cards if they are able to pay off the highest interest rate card in full. Heuristic 1 is 
repay the card with the lowest capacity. Heuristic 2 is repay the card with highest capacity. Heuristic 3 is repay the 
card with the highest balance. Heuristic 4 is repay the card with the lowest balance (debt snowball method). 1/N is 
exactly split repayments across cards. Samples are restricted to individual × months in which individuals face an 
economically meaningful allocative decision. All results shown in the table are based on the 20 percent hold-out 
sample. See Section IB for more details on the sample construction.
872 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2019
repayment behavior. Specifically we calculate the variable importance, which can 
be thought of as the proportional increase in  R 2 from adding a given variable to the 
model. Online Appendix Table A9 shows that APRs and balances are not strongly 
correlated. In cases where the variables are collinear, the interpretation of variable 
importance may be spurious (Mullainathan and Spiess 2017).
Consistent with the balance matching results, the machine learning models con-
firm that balances are hugely important for predicting behavior. Online Appendix 
Table A10 shows that balances have the highest variable importance in all of the 
models, with importance factors substantially larger than any of the other explan-
atory variables. Consistent with the poor fit of the optimal repayment rule, we find 
that APRs have the lowest variable importance across models. Online Appendix 
Table A11 shows minima and maxima of variable importance from models esti-
mated on 10 partitions of the training sample. Unlike some other machine learning 
applications (e.g., Mullainathan and Spiess 2017), the ranges are narrowly spread 
around the baseline estimates from online Appendix Table A10, indicating that our 
variable importance measures are not particularly sensitive to random variation in 
the training dataset.
Taken together, our  goodness-of-fit analysis supports the view that balance 
matching is a powerful predictor of credit card repayments, capturing more than 
half of the predictable variation in repayment behavior and performing substantially 
better than alternative models. In the horse race analysis, balance matching performs 
at a similar level to the machine learning models, and is highly persistent over time, 
suggesting it is more than a good statistical model but is actually capturing a stable 
feature of individual  decision-making.
VI. Discussion
The fact that individuals do not repay credit cards optimally, and instead repay in 
proportion to balances, has implications for the industrial organization of credit card 
markets and public policy. While it is beyond the scope of the paper to rigorously 
examine these implications, we provide some initial thoughts below.
To think through the implications for consumer and producer surplus, consider 
a  two-stage model of the credit card market. In stage 1, individuals shop for and 
select credit cards. In stage 2, individuals spend on and repay their credit cards. The 
analysis in this paper implies that conditional on reaching stage 2, individuals do not 
optimally concentrate their borrowing on their cheapest card. From the perspective 
of the issuer, this implies that being the high cost card in a consumers’ portfolio can 
generate large stage 2 profits. However, to understand the full effect of  non-optimal 
repayments on producer and consumer surplus, we need to understand how these 
stage 2 profits affect behavior in stage 1.
One possibility is that firms dissipate their stage 2 profits via competition for an 
“install base” of consumers in stage 1. If stage 2 profits lead firms to set very low 
stage 1 prices (e.g., teaser rates) to acquire an install base, then it is theoretically 
possible for firms to dissipate all of their stage 2 rents, and for consumer surplus 
to be similar to what it would be in a counterfactual scenario where consumers 
repay their balances optimally (although the timing of borrowing will still be dis-
torted from the teaser rate). A second possibility is that firms dissipate some, per-
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haps most, of their stage 2 profits in acquisition behavior. The large number of mail 
 solicitations, aggressive new card promotions, and heavy television advertising in 
the industry is consistent with this theory. To the extent that much of these acqui-
sition costs are businesses stealing from rivals, and not category expansion, this 
expenditure can be thought of as a deadweight loss. A third possibility is that firms 
do not dissipate much of their stage 2 profits in stage 1. This could occur because 
there are decreasing returns to acquisition activity (conditional on sending a mail 
solicitation every week, the marginal return to an additional mailer might be quite 
small). Adjudicating between these different possibilities is important but beyond 
the scope of this paper.
From a policy perspective, a natural response to the observed  non-optimality 
of repayments is to make interest rates more salient. While Seira, Elizondo, 
and  Laguna-Müggenburg (2017) found no effect of interest rate salience on indebt-
edness and defaults in their study of Mexican credit card holders, there may be alter-
native ways of presenting interest rate information that successfully shift behavior. 
A broader policy response is to make it easier for consumers to share credit card data 
with third parties, such as FinTech firms.47 In principle, these firms could use these 
data to help consumers optimize their repayments across their credit cards, although 
there is no guarantee that they will nudge consumers in an optimal direction.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we used linked data on multiple cards from five major credit card 
issuers to study how individuals repay their debt. First, we showed that the allo-
cation of repayments is highly  non-optimal, with individuals allocating only 51.5 
percent of their payments in excess of the minimum to the high APR card, relative 
to optimal repayments of 97.1 percent. These findings are almost identical to Ponce, 
Seira, and Zamarripa (2017), and indicate that the behavior they documented did not 
merely reflect limited consumer experience with credit cards in the Mexican market.
Second, we showed repayment behavior was inconsistent with models of optimi-
zation frictions. Specifically, we showed that degree of misallocation was invariant 
to the financial stakes of the repayment decision, implying that models of optimal 
inattention with a fixed cost of adjustment could not explain our findings. We also 
showed that the degree of misallocation is invariant to the time since account open-
ing, suggesting that a learning model cannot explain observed behavior.
The third part of the paper showed that repayment behavior is consistent 
with a  balance-matching heuristic under which the share of repayments on each 
card is matched to the share of balances on each card. In particular, we showed 
that  balance matching captures more than half of the predictable variation in 
repayments,  performs substantially better than other models, and is highly persistent 
within individuals over time. Making repayments in proportion to balances could 
arise from broad tendency for humans, and other species, to engage in “matching 
behavior” in related choice environments, but could also arise from individuals 
47 For instance, recently implemented Open Banking regulation in the United Kingdom requires large banks, 
at their consumers’ discretion, to give third parties access to account data through secure application programming 
interfaces (APIs).
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repaying a constant  percentage of their balances across cards. Unpacking the under-
lying explanations for repayment behavior is a fruitful area for future research.
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